![]() ![]() Sunt enim quaedam virtutes quae debitum quidem alteri reddunt, sed non possunt reddere aequale. Dupliciter igitur aliqua virtus ad alterum existens a ratione iustitiae deficit, uno quidem modo, inquantum deficit a ratione aequalis alio modo, inquantum deficit a ratione debiti. Ratio vero iustitiae consistit in hoc quod alteri reddatur quod ei debetur secundum aequalitatem, ut ex supradictis patet. Quia vero iustitia ad alterum est, ut ex supradictis patet, omnes virtutes quae ad alterum sunt possunt ratione convenientiae iustitiae annecti. Respondeo dicendum quod in virtutibus quae adiunguntur alicui principali virtuti duo sunt consideranda, primo quidem, quod virtutes illae in aliquo cum principali virtute conveniant secundo, quod in aliquo deficiant a perfecta ratione ipsius. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice are insufficiently enumerated. v, 10) mentions epieikeia as being annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any of the foregoing enumerations. ![]() Ergo insufficienter sunt enumeratae virtutes iustitiae annexae. 5 Praeterea, Aristoteles, in V Ethic., ponit epieikeiam iustitiae adiunctam, de qua in nulla praemissarum assignationum videtur mentio esse facta. "liberality, kindliness, revenge, commonsense, piety, gratitude, holiness, just exchange" and "just lawgiving" and of all these it is evident that Tully mentions none but "revenge." Therefore he would appear to have made an incomplete enumeration. Further, the peripatetic Andronicus reckons nine parts annexed to justice viz. 4 Praeterea, Andronicus Peripateticus ponit novem partes iustitiae annexas, scilicet liberalitatem, benignitatem, vindicativam, eugnomosynam, eusebiam, Eucharistiam, sanctitatem, bonam commutationem, legispositivam ex quibus etiam Tullius manifeste non ponit nisi vindicativam. Therefore he would seem to have enumerated insufficiently the virtues annexed to justice. "obedience" in respect of one's superiors, "discipline" with regard to inferiors, "equity" as regards equals, "fidelity" and "truthfulness" towards all and of these "truthfulness" alone is mentioned by Tully. Further, others reckon five parts of justice, viz. Ergo videtur insufficienter numerasse virtutes iustitiae annexas. 3 Praeterea, a quibusdam aliis ponuntur quinque partes iustitiae, scilicet obedientia respectu superioris, disciplina respectu inferioris, aequitas respectu aequalium, fides et veritas respectu omnium de quibus a Tullio non ponitur nisi veritas. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice would seem to be insufficiently enumerated. "innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection, humanity," several of which are omitted by Tully. Ergo videtur insufficienter enumeratas esse virtutes iustitiae adiunctas. 2 Praeterea, Macrobius, super somnium Scipionis, ponit septem, scilicet innocentiam, amicitiam, concordiam, pietatem, religionem, affectum, humanitatem quarum plures a Tullio praetermittuntur. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the virtues annexed to justice. ![]() "religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth." Now revenge is seemingly a species of commutative justice whereby revenge is taken for injuries inflicted, as stated above (Question 61, Article 4). It would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are unsuitably enumerated Tully [De Invent. Non ergo debet poni inter virtutes iustitiae annexas. Vindicatio autem videtur species esse commutativae iustitiae, secundum quam illatis iniuriis vindicta rependitur, ut ex supradictis patet. Tullius enim enumerat sex, scilicet religionem, pietatem, gratiam, vindicationem, observantiam, veritatem. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur virtutes iustitiae annexae. Et circa hoc duo sunt consideranda primo quidem, quae virtutes iustitiae annectantur secundo, considerandum est de singulis virtutibus iustitiae annexis. Deinde considerandum est de partibus potentialibus iustitiae, idest de virtutibus ei annexis.
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